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Abstract—Moving Target Defense (MTD) is a proactive security mechanism which changes the attack surface aiming to confuse
attackers. Cloud computing leverages MTD techniques to enhance cloud security posture against cyber threats. While many MTD
techniques have been applied to cloud computing, there has not been a joint evaluation of the effectiveness of MTD techniques with
respect to security and economic metrics. In this paper, we first introduce mathematical definitions for the combination of three MTD
techniques: Shuffle, Diversity, and Redundancy. Then, we utilize four security metrics including system risk, attack cost, return on
attack, and reliability to assess the effectiveness of the combined MTD techniques applied to large-scale cloud models. Secondly, we
focus on a specific context based on a cloud model for E-health applications to evaluate the effectiveness of the MTD techniques using
security and economic metrics. We introduce (1) a strategy to effectively deploy Shuffle MTD technique using a virtual machine
placement technique and (2) two strategies to deploy Diversity MTD technique through operating system diversification. As deploying
Diversity incurs cost, we formulate the Optimal Diversity Assignment Problem (O-DAP) and solve it as a binary linear programming
model to obtain the assignment which maximizes the expected net benefit.
Index Terms—Cloud Computing, Diversity, Economic Metrics, Redundancy, Security analysis, Shuffle, Optimization.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MOving Target Defense (MTD) techniques have beenproposed aiming to make a system dynamic, less
deterministic, and unpredictable for the cyber attackers by
continuously changing the attack surface [32]. The static
nature of the systems makes a system more attack-prone
since the attackers have enough time to learn the potential
attack ways, exploiting vulnerabilities, and eventually pen-
etrating into the system. Unlike the traditional defensive
security solutions such as anti-malware, Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDS), firewalls (which are usually expensive
and are reactive methods against possible threats), MTD
techniques are mostly proactive defensive techniques which
adopt the existing technologies in a system (e.g., virtual
machines, backup Operating Systems (OS), and so forth)
to introduce adequate levels of unpredictability to the at-
tackers and making security threatening attempts more
complicated. Consequently, such techniques are expected to
increase attacker’s efforts, time, and cost while potentially
decreasing the defensive costs compared to other alterna-
tive approaches. The proposed defensive MTD strategies
must be effective and efficient to prevent potential attacks
while being economically viable. In this paper, we leverage
MTD capabilities to secure cloud computing. The effects
of combining different MTD techniques are considered in
this paper by investigating various MTD properties when
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several techniques are deployed. We use the MTD classi-
fication proposed by Hong et al. [23], which are Shuffle,
Diversity, and Redundancy techniques. In general, Shuffle
MTD techniques may enhance the overall security of a
system by changing the attack surface of the system, but
it may have no effect on the system’s reliability, or even
deteriorate the reliability of the system. Redundancy MTD
techniques may enhance the reliability or availability of the
system while it may affect the overall security of a crucial
system in an opposite way (e.g. increase the system risk),
because it could potentially place the system in a more
vulnerable state, as described in [4]. Diversity MTD tech-
niques may increase the difficulties of attacks (e.g., software
vulnerability exploitation), but it may increase the cost of the
defense and therefore they have negative economic impacts.
Due to the uncertainty of deploying individual or combined
MTD techniques, the effectiveness of the proposed MTD
techniques has to be evaluated prior to deployment. One can
benefit from using a single MTD technique, but the problem
arises when a trade-off between security and dependability
(such as service availability or reliability) is required. It
is important to extensively investigate the ways in which
MTD techniques can be combined to optimally meet multi-
ple objectives such as increasing benefits and reducing the
undesirable effects.
In this paper, we aim to address the aforementioned
problems by evaluating the effectiveness of different MTD
techniques including Shuffle, Diversity, Redundancy, and
combinations of them for cloud computing. Accordingly,
we model and analyze MTD techniques using a graphi-
cal security model named Hierarchical Attack Represen-
tation Model (HARM) [21]. We identify applicable MTD
techniques in cloud computing environments and formally
define them. In addition, we use important measures such
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as network centrality measures (NCMs) to improve the
scalability of the evaluation process for large-sized cloud
computing systems.
We investigate the effects of combining different MTD
techniques from the three categories and evaluate them in
terms of both security and economic metrics by conducting
experiments based on two scenarios.
First, we perform experimental analysis to evaluate and
compare how combined MTD techniques affect the security
of the cloud systems in terms of both attacker’s and de-
fender’s perspectives. We conduct our experiments using
simulation on a large cloud-band model to evaluate the
effectiveness of combined MTD techniques using security
metrics including the system risk and attack cost to evaluate
the security from cloud provider’s point of view. Then, we
use return on attack to evaluate the effectiveness of com-
bined MTD techniques from attacker’s perspective. Finally,
we use another metrics to evaluate the reliability of the
cloud after deploying MTD techniques.
Secondly, we focus on more specific context studying the
evaluation the effectiveness of MTD techniques on an E-
health cloud model as a case study to assess the economic
aspects of deploying MTD techniques using economic met-
rics including return on security investment and expected
net benefit of security. We utilize both security and economic
metrics to show the effectiveness of the proposed MTD tech-
niques. We propose an effective Shuffle strategy to deploy
this technique in an appropriate way aiming to reduce eco-
nomic impacts while increase security level. We also extend
our study by conducting in-depth investigations on Diver-
sity MTD techniques considering the interplay between the
cost of security and the benefit of security. Diversity MTD
techniques may incur additional cost to the cloud providers
due to purchasing the license, component’s variants (such
as VMs) while the cloud providers usually have to deploy
defensive strategy with limited (allocated) budgets. Thus,
the use of various system’s components (such as backup
OS variants) should be precisely prioritized and possibly
optimized. To this end, we propose a Diversity strategy
based on the globally optimal solution of an optimization
model which maximizes the expected net benefit under all
possible Diversity assignments.
This paper is a continuation of a line of studies started
in [2]. In this paper, we extend our contributions as follows:
• We focus on formalism and definitions of combined
MTD techniques together with evaluation the MTD
techniques using the economic metrics alongside the
security metrics using simulation.
• We propose an optimization model which finds an
optimal solution to diversity assignment by consid-
ering both the cost and benefit of security.
• We provide the formal mathematical definitions for
combining Shuffle, Diversity, and Redundancy MTD
techniques.
• We evaluate the effectiveness of combined MTD
techniques using security metrics including Sys-
tem Risk (Risk), Attack Cost (AC), and Return
on Attack (RoA), and Reliability for a large cloud
model through simulation. We evaluate the com-
bined method by deploying Diversity on multiple
VMs in the cloud using OS diversification technique.
• We model an E-health cloud example (also called
Personal Health Cloud (PHC)) and evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of MTD techniques based on both secu-
rity and economic metrics.
• We provide a set of strategies in which Shuffle and
Diversity can be effectively deployed. We propose a
VM placement strategy for Shuffle and two strategies
for deploying Diversity based on deploying Diver-
sity (OS diversification) (i) with only one backup OS
and (ii) with multiple backup OS variants over the
set of VMs.
• To solve the second case mentioned above, we pro-
pose the Optimal Diversity Assignment Problem (O-
DAP) and formulate it as a binary linear program-
ming model. This allows us to find an assignment of
OS variants on multiple VMs in such a way that the
expected net benefit is maximized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we provide a comprehensive overview of the related work
and define MTD technique frameworks. Section 3 presents
the preliminaries of the paper including formalisms for com-
bination of MTD techniques. The proposed MTD definition
and evaluation criteria based on the security metrics are
given in Section 4. In Section 5, we evaluate the effectiveness
of MTD techniques with both economic and security metrics
as well as formulating an optimization model to solve the
O-DAP. In Section 6, we provide further discussions and
the limitations of the paper. Finally, the paper concludes in
Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
Several studies have been conducted on MTD theory, tech-
niques, and evaluation [10], [13], [50]. Hobson et al. [20]
introduced three main challenges of developing MTD as
coverage, unpredictability, and timeline. Zhuang et al. [51]
argue that an effective MTD technique should consider
the following issues: (1) the right pieces to be moved, (2)
sufficient space for movement, and (3) correct time for
movement. Similarly, Cai et al. [13] defined three aspects
for the movement of MTD techniques: (1) WHAT to move,
(2) HOW to move and (3) WHEN to move. However, these
studies have not discussed the cost or economic efficiency
of the MTD movement. They merely explore common prop-
erties of the MTD (movement selection, movement strategy
and movement time) that should be achieved when an MTD
technique is adopted. In addition to the total cost of security,
the relative cost of movement with respect to the achieved
security should be taken into account.
Our analysis framework contributes to the literature
by including (1) MTD techniques and categories, (2) MTD
applicable layers, and (3) definition of the combination of
MTD techniques at different cloud’s layers [14] (as shown
in Table 1).
Hong et al. [23] classified the MTD strategies into
three comprehensive categories as follows. Shuffle tech-
nique refers to any rearrangement of the system setting
in different software, hardware, and network layers like
changing or shuffling the IP address, re-arranging the net-
work’s topology, moving or migrating a VM, host, hardware
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TABLE 1: MTD techniques applicable in different cloud computing layers
Cloud Layer Diversity Redundancy Shuffle
Application Layer Web Services [15], [25], [44]Web Applications [8], [15], [25] Web [18], [46]
Port/IP [7], [29], [31]
Web App. [37]
HTTP [28], [45]
Platform Layer
Application/ Web service
Design [15], [25]
Database [15], [44]
Web Server Replica Web Service
Infrastructure Layer Operating System (OS)Virtualization [4], [23], [25]
Virtualization [4], [23]
SDN [42]
SDN, VM migration
[4], [23], [38]
Virtual IP [27]
to another location, and so forth [1], [33], [38]. Diversity
technique can be considered as replacing the components’
variant which can be a server, programming language,
operating system, hardware, and so forth, while the system
provides equivalent functionality with the previous state
(before changing the variant) [6], [35], [40]. Redundancy is
a technique through which one can increase the number of
components’ replica in the system, like servers, hardware,
OS, software, services, and so forth [46].
Shuffle technique has been proposed in several studies.
Most of the existing research studies focused on the novelty
of techniques, implementation, and application of Shuffle.
Jafarian et al. [27] implemented an IP shuffling technique
which mutates IP addresses unpredictably. They focus on
the minimization of the overhead of this operation after each
IP mutation. Moreover, the application of Shuffle techniques
on the cloud has been studied in [4], [17], [49]. Danev
et al. [17] proposed a Shuffle technique for securing the
cloud infrastructure. They focused on VM migration in the
cloud in a secure way. Their approach is to utilize an extra
physical trusted platform module and trusted parties for the
migration process. They also used public key infrastructure
to secure the protocol. Then, they suggest a comprehensive
evaluation of different criteria like assessing the main se-
curity services (CIA triad) and performance analysis of the
migration scenario in terms of time and RAM size usage
against cryptography protocols. Penner and Guirguis in [38]
developed a set of MTD technologies to change the location
of VMs in the cloud in order to defend against Multi-
Armed Bandit (MAB) attacks caused by weak VM isolation
in the cloud. They actually deploy MTD technique based
on attacker’s point of view. They showed that their method
can thwart MAB attack designed to find critical information
(e.g. databases and credit card information). They assessed
the performance of the proposed method by measuring
the time of switch VMs. However, most of the existing
techniques only focused on minimizing the overhead or
improving the performance and have not evaluated security
related impacts of MTD techniques using security models.
Therefore, there is a lack of evaluating economic impacts of
deploying MTD techniques alongside the security metrics
on cloud.
A method for deploying Diversity in the programming
language has been proposed by Taguinod et al. in [44]. A
Diversity technique on virtual servers has been proposed
by Huang et al. [25]. They aimed to improve the network
and services resiliency. They have evaluated their method
by computing the probability of attack success. In [8], the
authors developed a Diversity technique to change a run-
ning program’s variants erratically through which a large
program can be divided into smaller components (tasks).
They used a recovery mechanism to enhance the system
resilience. The idea is to use a different variant at runtime
to confuse the attacker. The application of Diversity on
cloud has been investigated in [3], [5], [23] from a security
perspective. However, these studies do not consider the
economic impacts of deploying Diversity on cloud. Re-
dundancy techniques have been proposed in [18], [46]. A
Redundancy technique on the application layer has been
introduced by Gorbenko et al. in [18]. They proposed a
method for web service replication aiming to improve the
dependability of the system. They evaluated their method
through performance analyses like system response time
and availability. Another Redundancy technique has been
proposed by Yuan et al. in [46]. They proposed an approach
to deploy Redundancy technique on web services aiming to
avoid malicious code injection attacks on the servers. They
did not assess the effectiveness of their proposed method
through security analysis.
There is a gap in the MTD studies in evaluating the
proposed MTD techniques based on security and economic
metrics. Only a few studies such as [9] have proposed eval-
uating the economic impacts of defensive techniques using
Graphical Security Models (GSMs) and economic metrics.
Security metrics can be incorporated into GSMs to evaluate
both the effectiveness of given network models and that of
the MTD techniques.
3 DEFINITIONS AND FORMALIZATION
3.1 HARM Construction
In order to perform the security analysis of the cloud and
further evaluate the effects of MTD techniques on the cloud,
we used the two-layered HARM [21] to model the cloud.
HARM consists of the upper layer to model the connectivity
of VMs, and the lower layer to capture the vulnerabilities
on each VM. Using the HARM, we can compute security
metrics for comparisons. We evaluate how the security
metrics change when MTD techniques are deployed, later
in Section 4.
Definition 1. We can show a HARM [22] as a 3-tuple
H = (U,L,C) where U refers to the upper layer which
is an Attack Graph (AG) and L represents the lower layer
in which an Attack Tree (AT) is constructed. We define C =
U → L as a one-by-one mapping of the upper layer to the
lower layer. The upper layer of HARM is defined as a graph
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U = (VM,E), where VM = {vm1, vm2, . . . , vmn} is a set
of VMs in the cloud, with |VM | = n, and E ∈ VM × VM
is a set of connectivities between the VMs. We show the
bidirectional graph of the VMs through a non-symmetric
adjacency matrix a in equation (1). The lower layer L is
a set of ATs corresponding to each VM vmi in the upper
layer and can be defined as L = {`1, `2, . . . , `n}, where
`i = (Vi,θ, G, root), and `i is an AT corresponding to the
vmi. Then, Vi,θ = {ν1,θ, ν2,θ, . . . , νm,θ} is a set of vulnerabili-
ties existing on each corresponding OS θ ∈ OS on each VM
vmi, where OS = {W,L, F} including Windows10, Linux,
and Fedora. We denote the number of vulnerabilities in each
VM (specifically, on each OS) as |Vi,θ| = m, and G is a set of
logical gates G = {AND-gate, OR-gate} constructing the
inner nodes of the AT, and root is the corresponding node
in U .
aij =
{
1 if (i, j) ∈ E
0 if (i, j) /∈ E (1)
3.2 Importance Measures
As stated earlier, the upper layer of HARM represents a
comprehensive scheme of the connectivity of VMs in the
cloud through a graph. To efficiently carry out the security
analysis, it is important to identify the most important
components (in here VMs) of the network. We use two
important Network Centrality Measures (NCM): closeness
and betweenness [12] for identifying the VMs playing a
more crucial role in the cloud. In Section 4, we show how
Importance Measures (IMs) can be utilized to find more
effective MTD strategies.
Definition 2. NCMs can be computed for the upper layer
of HARM defined in Definition (1). Let d be a function
calculating the geodesic distance of two VMs in AG in the
upper layer of HARM, then we can calculate the closeness
centrality (Cc) of a specific VM in the network in equa-
tion (2).
Cc(vmi) = (n− 1)
( ∑
j 6=i∈VM
d(vmi, vmj)
)−1
(2)
Betweenness centrality (Cb) of a VM can be computed
using equation (3).
Cb(vmi) =
∑
s,t∈VM\{vmi}
δst(vmi)
δst
, (3)
In equation (3), δst is a function calculating the total
number of the shortest path between each pair of VMs
(s, t) ∈ VM , and δst(vmi) denotes the number of such
paths passing through the specific VM (vmi).
We consider three criteria to select VMs on the cloud
in order to deploy MTD techniques on them. We defined
three Selection Criteria (SC). (i) The VMs can be ranked
and selected based on their Cb values , (ii) the SC can be
based on Cc value , or (iii) none of them (i.e. random VM is
selected using random selection function denoted by f ), as
in Equation (4).
k =

arg max
vmi∈VM
Cb(vmi), if SC = Cb
arg max
vmi∈VM
Cc(vmi), if SC = Cc
f(1, |VM |), otherwise
(4)
Then, the value of k determines the argument of the VM
that needs to be selected for deploying MTD technique on.
For instance, k = 3 shows that MTD technique should be
applied on vm3.
3.3 Security Metrics
In this section, we utilize four security metrics (i) System
Risk (Risk), (ii) Attack Cost (AC), (iii) Return on Attack
(RoA), and (iv) System Reliability (Reliability) to evaluate
the security of the cloud after deploying MTD techniques
and identify the most suitable technique deployment strate-
gies. Risk is based on the vulnerabilities of the network’s
components [23]. AC measures the difficulties of attackers
to attack a system and can be quantified in terms of cost
incurred by an attacker to exploit a network component
or the whole system [47]. RoA shows the willingness of
the attacker to use the same components, attack path(s),
and vulnerabilities to penetrate the network. RoA quan-
tifies the cost of an attack versus the benefit of the at-
tack [16]. Reliability quantifies the reliability of the net-
work’s components (i.e. critical components) under certain
attack circumstances. Calculation of system Reliability can
be performed using the SHARPE (Symbolic Hierarchical
Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator) analytic
modeling software tool [41]. More detailed discussions on
computing these four security perspective metrics can be
found in [3], [4].
3.4 MTD Formalism
We utilize the Virtual Machine Live Migration (VM-LM) as
the main technique for deploying Shuffle MTD technique
which can be formulated based on the HARM definition as
follows.
Definition 3. Let S(H,κ) be a Shuffle function on the
HARM where 1 ≤ κ ≤ n, and κ denotes a specific VM
vmκ ∈ VM chosen for the shuffling procedure. Then
the result of Shuffle function is as S(H,κ) = Hs. We
define Hs = (U s,κ, L, C) where U s,κ is the transformed
AG resulted from Shuffle on vmk in the upper layer of the
TABLE 2: Description and formalism for security metrics.
Notations Metrics Description Reference and Formula
AP An attack path from attacker to target (DB) -
APc All possible attack paths in a cloud -
P (vm) Attack success probability for a single VM lower layer of HARM
Ivm The impact of a successful attack on a VM NVD [34], [36]
Riskvm The risk value associated with a VM p(vm)× Ivm
Riskp The risk of a single attack path
∑
Riskvmi , vmi ∈ AP
Riskc The overall risk value of a cloud
∑
Riskp, p ∈ APc
ACvm Attack cost of exploiting a single VM NVD, [47]
ACp Attack cost of an attack path
∑
ACvmi , vmi ∈ AP
ACc The overall attack cost for a cloud
∑
ACp, p ∈ APc
RoAvm Return on attack value of a VM
p(vm)×Ivm
ACvm
RoAp Return on attack for an attack path
∑
RoAvmi , vmi ∈ AP
RoAc The overall return on attack for a cloud
∑
RoAp, p ∈ APc
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(b)
Figure 1: The Cloud-band model. (a) Cloud-band model including two cloud-band nodes and one resource node, (b) An
example of the generated HARM for the cloud-band model with 30 VMs which shows VM’s connectivity and vulnerabilities
in the upper and lower layers respectively (note that this cloud-band model can holds up to 450 VMs).
HARM and can be represented as U s,κ = (VM,E′), where
E′ ⊆ VM × VM .
Diversity technique is formulated as follows.
Definition 4. We formulate the Diversity technique in
which the Diversity function is applied on H as D(H,κ) =
Hd, where κ denotes a specific VM vmκ ∈ VM se-
lected for being replaced with another OS variant. Then,
Hd = (U,Ld,k, C) is the result of deploying Diversity
technique, where Ld,k = {`1, . . . , `k, . . . , `n} denotes the
ATs corresponding to each VM and `k = (Vk,θ, G, root) is
the transformed AT of vmk which is replaced with another
variant θ ∈ OS. Diversity technique affects the lower layer
and varies vulnerabilities Vk,θ={ν1,θ, ν2,θ, . . . , νm,θ}, while
U=(VM,E) is preserved.
We formulate the Redundancy technique as follows.
Definition 5. Let R(H, k, r) be a Redundancy function
on HARM where k denotes the VM that should be repli-
cated r times. Then, the resulting Redundancy function is
R(H, k, r) = H r, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n and r ≤ l, and l is a limit
for replication of a VM. Thus, vmrk shows the replicated VM
in the upper layer. We define H r = (U rk, L
r
k, C) where U
r
k
is a transformed AG resulted from r times replication of
vmk in the upper layer of HARM and can be represented as
U rk = (VM
′, E′), where VM ′ can be shown as:
VM ′ = VM ∪
( l⋃
r=1
VM rk
)
and |VM ′| = n+ r, and E′ ⊆ VM ′ × VM ′.
Replication of VMs in the upper layer results in adding
vulnerabilities in the lower layer of HARM, then we can
define the lower layer as follows.
Definition 6. Suppose that V r is a set of vulnerabilities
caused by replication of a VM in the upper layer of HARM,
then the lower layer of HARM can be updated based on
Lrk = (V
′, G, root), where V ′ = V ∪ V r .
We formulate the combination of Shuffle, Diversity, and
Redundancy (S+D+R) as a function on HARM as follow:
Definition 7. Let S+D+R(H, ks, kd, kr, r) be a S+D+R func-
tion on HARM where kr shows the VM selected to be
replicated r times, ks is the VM selected to be shuffled, and
kd denotes the VM selected for Diversity technique. Then
the resulting S+D+R function is S+D+R(H, ks, kd, kr, r) =
Hs+d+r, where 1 ≤ ks, kd, kr ≤ n and 0 < r ≤ l.
We define Hs+d+r = (U s+d+rkr,ks , L
s+d+r
kr,kd
, C) where U s+rkr,ks is a
transformed AG in the upper layer in which S+R is de-
ployed on and Ls+rkr,kd is the corresponding transferred AT
in the lower layer. Then, the former can be represented as
U s+d+rkr,ks = (VM
′, E′), where VM ′ can be shown as:
VM ′ = VM ∪
( l⋃
r=1
VM rkr
)
and |VM ′| = n+ r, and E′ ⊆ (VM + r)× (VM + r). Next,
the latter can be shown as Ls+d+rkr,kd = (V
′, G, root), where
V ′ = V ∪ V r ∪ V d, and V r is a set of vulnerabilities caused
by replication of a VM, and V d is a set of new vulnerabilities
introduced by replacing the OS.
4 MTD SECURITY ANALYSIS
4.1 Large Cloud Model
In this section, we use an example of a large cloud model
based on the cloud-band system. A cloud-band system is
typically consisting of two main cloud band nodes each
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Figure 2: Security analysis results of the current cloud-band
accommodating up to 450 VMs and one resource node
connecting to a Database (DB). The (cloud) system model
can be used as an input to generate the graphical security
with HARM formalism described in Subsection 3.1, which
can be used for evaluating the security of the cloud. Fig-
ure 1 demonstrates the abstract cloud-band model and a
related HARM. In this model, we assume that an attacker
is outside of the cloud-band. The attacker can penetrate
into the cloud by exploiting vulnerabilities of VMs in the
first cloud band node. We assume there exist vulnerabil-
ities that can be exploited by the attacker to give them
the root privilege. We use the information from reported
vulnerabilities and rankings which are populated from the
vulnerability databases such as the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [34]. Further assumptions are as follows:
(1) cloud provider permits Virtual Machine-Live Migration
(VM-LM) for cloud-band nodes, (2) VM-LM downtime is
negligible, (3) cloud provider purchases enough licenses for
backup OS, and (4) VMs’ OS can be replaced with other
variants if needed.
The HARM can be used to compute the security metrics
such asRisk,AC , andRoA. For the comprehensive security
overview, the computation will incorporate the analysis of
all possible attack paths that are calculated using the upper
layer of the HARM (the formulas are shown in Table 2).
For the reliability analysis, we use the SHARPE software
package [41]. We assume that the attack rate for cloud-band
models follows an exponential function with an average
value of 0.2 (i.e., one attack per every five hours). Also, we
compute the Reliability values during a 10-hour period.
We compute the defined security metrics of the current
cloud-band system before deploying the MTD techniques
on the cloud. We calculate these metrics for different cloud-
band sizes ranging from 150 VMs up to 400 VMs in the
cloud-band. Figure 2 compares the metrics obtained through
analyzing HARM for the cloud-band model which shows
that larger cloud-band sizes have more Risk, AC , and RoA
values. However, In the following sections, we compare
the results obtained from deploying MTD techniques on
the cloud-band against the current security posture of the
cloud to investigate the effectiveness of the deployed MTD
techniques.
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Figure 3: Comparison of AC and Risk values obtained
after deploying the Diversity technique on the multiple VMs
having the highest Betweenness values for the cloud-band
example with various node sizes.
4.2 Diversity on Multiple VMs
Diversity MTD techniques play a crucial role in increasing
the required efforts for attackers. Attackers must spend time,
monetary budget, and efforts to gain sufficient knowledge
to discover and exploit the vulnerabilities of a system (i.e.
network’s component, a VM, service, and OS). Any sudden
changes in those component confuses the attacker, which
also increases the time and effort needed for carrying out the
attack. We consider using the OS diversification method as
the main technique for deploying Diversity. In this section,
we consider deploying Diversity techniques on multiple
VMs (i.e., for different subsets of VMs). To evaluate the
effectiveness of the Diversity MTD technique, we deploy
OS diversification on multiple VMs based on three selection
criteria (SC) as Equation 4: (i) Betweenness VM Selection
(BVS), (ii) Closeness VM Selection (CVS), and (iii) Random
VM Selection (RVS) . The RVS method selects a set of
random VMs in the cloud. The BVS method selects the set
of VMs based on their higher Betweenness ranks, which is
one of the NCM measures. Similarly, the CVS method uses
the Closeness ranks of the VMs in the cloud-band.
Deploying the Diversity MTD technique preserves the
upper layer of HARM. In here, we assume that the cloud
provider has up to five OS variants backup. Note that
increasing OS variants costs cloud provider (i.e. purchase
OS licenses for OS variants). For simplicity, in this section,
we do not consider the cloud provider cost.
Our approaches, formulas, and references of calculating
AC , Risk, and other security metrics are given in Table 2.
Other approaches to calculating AC can be found in [24].
Figure 3 shows theAC andRisk metrics after deploying Di-
versity on multiple VMs ranked based on higher Between-
ness values. We denote xV as deploying new variants on
x selected VMs respectively. Then, 5V represents deploying
five OS variants on the five selected VMs. We observe that
deploying Diversity on the VMs with higher Betweenness
ranks results in a larger increase in cost for the attacker
and increases the AC value. This increase will be higher
if we add to the the number of OS variants and deploy
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Figure 4: Comparing the result ofRoAmetrics after deploying Diversity on multiple nodes selected based on three different
criteria on the cloud-band with various number of VMs.
the Diversity technique on multiple nodes. Deploying OS
diversification by assigning 5V in a cloud band with 400
VMs increases AC value from around 2.3 million to 3
million, while the increase for 1V does not go beyond 2.5
million.
We do not observe a substantial change in Risk values
after deploying Diversity MTD techniques. The Risk value
remains almost steady after increasing OS variants, but it
still increases exponentially by increasing the cloud-band
nodes, see Figure 3.
Figure 4 compares the results of RoA metric through de-
ploying Diversity on three VM selection groups: BVS, CVS,
and RVS in different cloud-band sizes. These observations
indicate that deploying Diversity on a set of VMs selected
using BVS provides the best results in comparison to the
other groups. The values of RoA for RVS groups have very
gentle decrements while OS diversification increases. How-
ever, both RoA values for BVS and CVS groups decrease
sharply when increasing OS diversification numbers. Other
results for different cloud-band nodes show the same trend,
but as it is expected, RoA values for cloud-band including
more VMs are higher (i.e. RoA values of cloud-band with
400 VMs are between 1 and 1.5 million, Figure 4c, while
this rate is between 300 and 350 thousand for cloud-band
including 200 VMs, Figure 4a).
4.3 Combining Shuffle, Diversity, and Redundancy
We combine the main three MTD techniques, Shuffle, Diver-
sity, and Redundancy (S+D+R) to investigate the enhanced
the security of the cloud. It is important to quantify the
effects of the combined MTD techniques and compare them
with the current security level of the system. In order to
combine the three techniques, we set combination criteria
based on the results obtained from previous sections.
The results discussed in Section 4.2 showed that OS
diversification on the VMs having higher Betweenness
(grouped in BVS) has a better effect on security metrics.
They also revealed that increasing the numbers of OS
variants increases AC and decreases RoA. Based on those
results, we only consider BVS group for deploying Diversity
in this section. Moreover, based on the results of previous
studies reported in [4] for combining Shuffle and Redun-
dancy techniques, we deploy Shuffle technique on the most
suitable VM which can be found through analyzing only the
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Figure 5: (a) Comparing the results of AC and RoA for D-
Only with S+D+R. (b) Comparing the Reliability values
after S+R+D against Reliability value for current cloud-
band for n = 150, 400.
top 10% of the VMs holding higher values of Betweenness.
Finally, We deploy Redundancy on DB or VMs connected
to DB (target) to increase the Reliability of the cloud and
availability of DB against DDoS attacks.
We deployed the S+D+R technique with 5V on the
cloud-band and evaluate the results. Figure 6 compares the
results of deploying S+D+R on the cloud-band with 350
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Figure 6: Line chart comparing normalized metrics of the cloud-band with n = 350 before and after deploying S+D+R:
Upper line charts show the current cloud-band and lower line charts show the metrics after deploying MTD techniques.
Figure 7: an E-Health cloud model including PHI records
VMs. It is clear that all security metrics are improved after
deployment.
Figure 5a comparesAC andRoAmetrics after deploying
S+R+D with 5V against Diversity (D-Only). We observe that
the values of AC in D-Only are lower than AC in S+D+R.
However, the corresponding RoA values for S+D+R is also
lower in D-Only which shows the attacker has less tendency
to attack again. Figure 5b compares the Reliability values
of the cloud-band with 150 and 400 VMs before and after
deploying S+D+R technique. We select the boundaries of
n = 150 and n = 200 as the other values of n fall between
these two boundaries. We can observe how Reliability
values increase after deploying S+D+R. After passing 10
hours of assumed attack with α=0.2, the cloud-bands which
are secured with S+D+R are around 40% available, while
this rate reaches almost 0% for current cloud-bands without
deploying MTD techniques.
Nevertheless, combining MTD techniques can be quan-
tified based on the security levels expected by cloud
providers of network administrators. Deploying MTD tech-
niques may be costly and it is important for cloud providers
to find a trade-off between security and economic require-
ments.
5 ECONOMIC METRICS FOR MTD TECHNIQUES
Although security metrics show different dimensions of
a cloud’s security posture, investigating economic aspects
of deploying MTD techniques are also crucial. In here,
we compute various economic metrics to show different
perspectives of MTD deployment scenarios for a cloud
example.
5.1 A Case Study on E-Health Cloud Model
We consider that the personal health information (PHI) of
patients including medical histories are located in a private
A
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Figure 8: Generated Two-layer HARM for the Cloud.
personal health cloud (PHC) as shown in Figure 7. We
assume that the attacker is located out of the cloud and
can use the vulnerabilities of the cloud’s components (e.g.,
VMs) to get into the cloud and find a path to the PHI
database. In this section, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness
of MTD techniques in terms of economic metrics. We first
model the cloud using HARM demonstrated in Figure 8.
Table 3 demonstrates the vulnerabilities existing on each
VM [36]. Moreover, we assume that the cloud provider has
one backup OS which can be used for Diversity. We assume
that PHI records are stored in a DB connected to vm10
and any successful attack exploiting vm10 incurs significant
damage of 10000$ to the organization (due to loss and/or
disclosure of patients health information).
5.2 Single Loss Expectancy
The Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) measures an organiza-
tion’s loss from a single threat [30]. SLE can be determined
for a cloud based on the Asset Values (AV) for each VM
including costs of maintenance, running OS, services, DB
record values, applications, and so forth. The estimated AV
for each OS is shown in Table 3. We assume that SLE can
be calculated for both VM and network (cloud) levels. The
value of SLE for a VM can be obtained by multiplying asset
value and the maximum percentage of loss for that asset
caused by a treat which is called exposure factor (EF), see
Equation 5.
SLEvmi =
(
1−
∏
vj,θ∈Vi,θ
(
1− EFvj,θ
))
×AVvmi (5)
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TABLE 3: VM Assets and Vulnerabilities (Note that vm10 is the target VM and includes PHI records.)
VMs OS (θ) Asset Value(AV) ($)
Vulnerabilities (V)
V-ID CVE-ID Threat Exploitability AC EF (%)
vm1−vm5 Win10 500
ν1,W CVE-2018-8490 Remote 0.17 1.6 0.6
ν2,W CVE-2018-8484 Privilege Escalation 0.18 2.2 0.59
ν3,W CVE-2018-0784 Privilege Elevation 0.28 1.2 0.59
vm6−vm9 Linux 480
ν1,L CVE-2018-14678 DDoS 0.18 2.2 0.59
ν2,L CVE-2018-14633 DDoS & Remote 0.22 3 0.47
ν3,L CVE-2017-15126 Use After Free (UAF) 0.22 1.9 0.59
vm10 Linux 10000
ν1,L CVE-2018-14678 DDoS 0.18 2.2 0.59
ν2,L CVE-2018-14633 DDoS & Remote 0.22 3 0.47
Backup OS Fedora 450 ν1,F CVE-2014-1859 Symlink attack 0.18 4.5 0.3
In Equation 5, the AV consists of the cost associated with
running an active VM (i.e. purchasing a license for an OS,
applications, values of DB, etc.)
The SLE for the cloud (SLEc) including all assets (in
here VMs) can be calculated based on Equation 6.
SLEc =
∑
ap∈AP
( ∑
vmi∈ap
SLEvmi
)
(6)
5.3 Annual Loss Expectancy
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) can be defined as the ex-
pected financial loss due to an attack event and can be
computed by the product of SLE and Annualized Rate of
Occurrence (ARO) which represents the estimated number
of occurrences of a threat event per year [30]. However, due
to lack of real data to estimate ARO, we assume ARO value
to be 1 (similar to [9]).
ALEc =
∑
ap∈AP
( ∑
vmi∈ap
SLEvmi ×AROvmi
)
(7)
5.4 Benefit of Security
Many defensive strategies can be adapted to the cloud to
either avoid or mitigate the exploitation or damages to the
cloud. In this paper, we evaluate the benefits achieved by
deploying MTD techniques. Benefits of Security (BS) [9]
can be used to show the effects of deploying a single or
combined defensive techniques. The benefit of security for a
cloud BSc can be computed based on Equation 8.
BSµc = ALEc − (ALEµc ×MFµ) (8)
In Equation 8, ALEµc denotes ALE value of the cloud after
deploying MTD techniques. µ ⊆ {S,D,R} denoted a set
of MTD used as defensive technique. Mitigation Factor
MFµ shows the ability of the defensive MTD techniques
to mitigate the ALE which can be mapped to [0, 1] as in
Equation 9.
MFµ =
{
1− ALEµcALEc , ALEµc > if ALEc
0, otherwise
(9)
5.5 Cost of Security
Cost of Security (CS) consists of any expenses associated
with the factors such as deployment, purchase, mainte-
nance, patching costs, ets. for a defensive security mech-
anism [11]. In fact, cost of security may also include loss
of productivity due to system downtime or other security-
related activities such as training which causes indirect
costs. However, for simplicity, we present the following
assumptions for costs of security. We assume that the unit
cost of deploying Shuffle technique for a given VM is 20$
per operation which includes the costs of experts and loss of
productivity. We also assume that the unit cost of deploying
Diversity on a VM such that a given VM is replaced with
the backup OS (Fedora in Table 3) is 55$ per operation
which includes the costs of experts, maintenance, and loss of
productivity for a given VM for an operation per year [39],
[43].
5.6 Return on Security Investment
The overall benefits of the selected defensive MTD strategies
against the costs of implementation can be evaluated using
Return on Security Investment (RoSI) metric. RoSI can be
used to evaluate the profitability of a defensive investment
against the costs as formulated in Equation 10.
RoSIµc =
BSµc − CSµ
CSµ
(10)
5.7 Shuffle Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the Shuffle technique on the PHC
cloud example based on economic metrics. We propose a
VM placement strategy based on the shortest path in the
upper layer of HARM. We aim to enhance the migration
scenarios for Shuffle technique by using the shortest path
rather than random VM placement strategy. The idea behind
selecting the shortest path strategy for VM placement is to
increase the Shortest Attack Path (SAP) [48] alongside other
benefits of Shuffle technique.
Migration Strategy. We propose the shortest path injection
approach in which a selected VM can be moved and con-
nected to the VMs located in the shortest path in the upper
layer of HARM. Since there may be more than one shortest
path we utilize a migration strategy to find the most critical
shortest path as in Equation (11).
Let SAP = {sp1, sp2, sp3, . . . , spq} be a set of possible
shortest paths existing in the upper layer of HARM. Then,
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TABLE 4: The results of deploying Shuffle on each VM in
the cloud
VM ID Security Metrics Economic Metrics
RiskSc AC
S
c RoA
S
c ALE
S
c ($) BS
S
c ($) RoSI
S
c
vm5 118.35 136.7 77.51 113878 46315 2315
vm6 126.14 134.7 87.19 114913 45281 2263
vm9 117.65 124.7 81.7 107563 52630 2631
vm4 128.97 142.5 87.15 115712 44482 2223
vm2 135.58 147.3 92.66 116912 43282 2163
vm3 149.98 163.5 102.27 131045 29149 1456
vm1 140.54 150.9 96.79 117812 42382 2118
vm7 145.73 158.5 99.52 130178 30015 1500
vm8 182.07 198.3 124.23 159910 283 13
Best vm5 vm8 vm5 vm9 vm9 vm9
we define the strategy Tsp as a selected shortest path having
lower in-degree values as follows.
Tsp = min
sp∈SAP
( ∑
vmi∈sp
∑
j≤n
aij
)
(11)
We deploy Shuffle techniques on all VMs in the upper
layer of HARM and evaluate the effectiveness of each
migration scenario. We compare both security and eco-
nomic metrics to find the best deployment scenario. Table 4
demonstrates the results of Shuffle on the VMs based on
Riskc, ACc, and RoAc security metrics, and ALEc, BSc,
and RoSIc economic metrics. Table 4 shows that the most
promising results for security metrics is deploying Shuffle
on VM vm5 which yields the lowest Riskv and RoAc
values. While, deploying Shuffle on VM vm9 leads to the
best results for economic metrics which yields the highest
RoSIc=2631 compared to the other deployment scenarios.
However, in the case that VM vm9 is selected for Shuffle,
it still yields appropriate results for RoA which is about 87
(the second best RoAc value). In fact, the cloud provider
can incorporate both RoA and RoSI in the decision making
process and prioritize based on their values.
5.8 Diversity Evaluation
In Subsection 4.2, we evaluated Diversity using security
metrics through a large cloud-band model. In here, we ex-
tend Diversity evaluation by considering economic metrics
and optimization. We consider deploying Diversity based
on two scenarios: (i) Diversity on single or multiple VMs
using a single backup OS and (ii) Diversity on multiple VMs
using multiple backup OS (using an optimization model).
TABLE 5: The results of deploying Diversity on each VM in
the cloud
VM ID Security Metrics Economic Metrics
RiskDc AC
D
c RoA
D
c ALE
D
c ($) BS
D
c ($) RoSI
D
c
vm5 167.31 253 105.19 157266 2928 52.24
vm6 174.27 236.6 117.37 157867 2327 41.31
vm9 173.62 239.2 116.83 157701 2493 44.33
vm4 171.32 239.8 110.12 157998 2196 38.93
vm2 173.33 233.2 112.59 158364 1830 32.27
vm3 177.35 220 117.52 159096 1098 18.96
vm1 171.32 239.8 110.12 157998 2196 38.93
vm7 175.57 231.4 118.44 158199 1994 35.26
vm8 178.82 218.4 121.14 159030 1163 20.15
Best vm5 vm5 vm5 vm5 vm5 vm5
Scenario 1. We deploy Diversity only on a single VM
through Exhaustive Search (ES). We evaluate the effective-
ness of Diversity technique through computing security and
economic metrics. Table 5 shows the results of deploying
Diversity on each VM. The experimental results show that
deploying Diversity on VM vm5 yields the best results
in terms of Riskc, ACc and RoAc for security metrics. It
provides the best result for economic metrics as it yields
the lowest ALEc which is 157266. It also leads to the
highest BSc and RoSIc values which are 2928 and 52.24,
respectively.
Scenario 2. We evaluate the Diversity deployment on vari-
ous VMs with a single backup OS. To do this, we leverage
two strategies to find a set of VMs for deploying Diversity
(OS diversification): Random VM Selection (RVS) and Be-
tweenness VM Selection (BVS) (as in Subsection 4.2). We
compere the results of deploying those two strategies on
the PHC cloud example focusing on return on security
investment and cost of security. We aim to find a trade-
off between the number of OS diversification (using the
same back up OS) on a set of VMs against the CS while
we maximize the RoSI. Figure 9 compares the results of
deploying Diversity on RoSI values based on two RVS and
BVS strategies on various number of VMs (from 1 to 9 OS
diversification). The results show that deploying Diversity
on the four VMs having the highest Betweenness values
reach the peak and yields the best RoSI values while the cost
of security remains between 100$ and 150$. However, the
results based on RVS strategies suggest that deploying nine
backup OS to increase the RoSI, but it incurs the highest cost
of security which is more than 250$. Moreover, the highest
RoSI metric after deploying BVS is about 75, while the same
metric resulting from RVS strategy reaches 70 in the best
case.
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Figure 9: Comparing RoSI values obtained after deploying
Diversity on various VMs against CS based on RVS and BVS
(the asterisked point shows the optimal solution.)
5.9 Optimal Diversity Assignment
In this section, we analyze the Diversity technique with mul-
tiple OS variants on multiple VMs through an optimization
model. We model the decision problem of maximizing ex-
pected net benefit by assigning backup operating systems to
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existing virtual machines as a mathematical programming
model with binary decision variables. In our model, we
consider a graph coloring scheme so that each backup OS
variant is assigned with a color (c) in the graph such that
no two adjacent VMs are assigned the same color (Backup
OS). This aims to increase the difficulty for the attacker who
would encounter a different back up OS in adjacent VMs
through the attack path.
We use θ = {1, 2, . . . , k = |θ|} to represent the set of all
potential backup operating systems from which to choose to
implement Diversity on some virtual machines.
We use the binary decision variable dic ∀i ∈ VM, c ∈ θ
for virtual machine i and backup operating system c such
that dic takes value 1 if and only if backup operating system
c is assigned to virtual machine i. We also use the binary
decision variable ei ∀i ∈ VM for virtual machine i which
takes value 1 if and only if virtual machine i is assigned a
backup operating system.
In our mathematical programming model, we penalize
diversity assignments in which the same operating system is
assigned to adjacent nodes. Accordingly, we use the binary
decision variable fij ∀(i, j) ∈ E to penalize assigning of
same backup operating system on endpoint i and endpoint
j of the edge (i, j).
The maximization objective function represents the ex-
pected net benefit (ENB) which is calculated based on
Equation (12) in which M represents a large enough value
to be used as “big M” for penalizing same backup operating
system being assigned to adjacent nodes.
ENB =ALEafter −ALEbefore
− cost of security−
∑
(i,j)∈E
Mfij
=
∑
p∈paths
∑
i∈p
SLEdi AROi −
∑
p∈paths
∑
i∈p
SLEiAROi
−
∑
i∈VM
∑
c∈θ
CScdic −
∑
(i,j)∈E
Mfij
(12)
The objective function in (12) is formed first by sub-
tracting the cost of security incurred from implementing
Diversity technique from the benefit of security which was
formulated in (8). Secondly, the penalty of assigning same
backup operating system on adjacent nodes is applied to
the objective function.
We formulate the term SLEdi using the binary deci-
sion variables dic and ei in (13). According to this linear
formulation, the SLEd for virtual machine i remains un-
changed if no backup operating system is assigned to it
(ei = dic = 0 ∀c ∈ θ). However, if backup operating
system c is assigned to virtual machine i (ei = dic = 1),
the value of SLEd is updated according to the asset value
and exploitability factor of the assigned backup operating
system c.
SLEdi = SLEi(1− ei) +
∑
i∈VM
∑
c∈θ
dicAV cEF c (13)
The maximum expected net benefit under all possible
assignments of |θ| potential backup operating systems on
|VM | virtual machines is obtained by solving the Optimal
Diversity Assignment Problem (O-DAP) formulated in (14) as
a binary linear optimization model.
max
dic:i∈VM,c∈θ,ei:i∈VM,fij :(i,j)∈E
Z = ENB
s.t.
∑
c
dic ≥ ei ∀i ∈ VM
fij ≥ dic + djc − 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E,∀c ∈ θ
dic ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ VM,∀c ∈ θ
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ VM
fij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E
(14)
Given a network of virtual machines with certain asset
values and exploitability factors before implementing any
Diversity techniques (before solving the optimization prob-
lem), ALEbefore can be computed by summing SLE×ARO
over all virtual machines in all attack paths. Based on
the binary decision variables dic and ei, ALEafter can be
computed after updating SLEd values according to (13).
The dependencies between the dic and ei values are
taken into account using the first constraint in (12) (one
linear constraint for each virtual machine) which also sup-
ports the natural constraint that each virtual machine gets
at most one backup operating system. The second constraint
in (12) is for obtaining the edges (i, j) for which the same
backup operating system is assigned on adjacent nodes.
Accordingly, O-DAP model has (|θ|+ 1)|VM |+ |E| binary
decision variables and |VM |+ |E| constraints.
Generally, the problem of assigning |θ| potential
backup operating systems on |VM | virtual machines has
(|θ|+ 1)|VM | solutions because each virtual machine can
independent of others get either one of the backup oper-
ating systems or none. Therefore, the solution to O-DAP
for instances with a large |VM | and |θ| cannot be found
by exhaustively going through all (|θ|+ 1)|VM | possibilities
and finding the solution with the maximum desired output.
However, our formulation provided in (14) is a binary linear
programming model and can be used to efficiently find the
globally optimal solutions to large instances with thousands
of virtual machines in a reasonable time.
5.10 Numerical Experiment of Optimization Model
In this section, we discuss a numerical example with seven
potential backup operating systems to be implemented as
Diversity technique on nine virtual machines in the upper
layer of HARM shown in Figure 8 and solve it using Gurobi
solver [19].
Table 6 shows a E-Health cloud equipped with various
backup OS variants which can be used for Diversity tech-
niques. The table represents the number of patched or miti-
gated vulnerabilities and the cost of security for each entry
as well as the asset value for each VM. It is assumed that
more secure backup variants have higher cost of security
values, and accordingly have less impact of damage.
According to Table 6, the seven backup systems have
cost of security, exploitability factor, and asset values in
Table 7.
Based on the upper layer of HARM shown in Figure 8,
the values for ALEbefore, SLEi, and AROi are as follows:
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TABLE 6: Backup OS variants used for the optimization test
case
No. Backup OS (θ) Vulnerabilities (V) CS ($) AV ($)|V | EF
1 HP-UX 11i 4 0.55 55 450
2 Windows (Win 8) 4 0.53 65 490
3 Solaris 3 0.51 80 550
4 Win XP 3 0.49 100 590
5 CentOS 2 0.47 120 620
6 OpenBSD 1 0.45 150 680
7 Win Server 2008 1 0.43 200 690
ALEbefore = 160194
SLE = [300.0, 300.0, 300.0, 300.0, 283.2
, 283.2, 283.2, 283.2, 283.2, 5900.0]
ARO = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
The Gurobi [19] model for this instance of the O-DAP is
provided in the Appendix in which the value of “big M” is
considered to be 100000.
While this instance of the problem has (|θ|+ 1)|VM | =
89 = 134217728 feasible solutions, Gurobi solver obtains
the globally optimal solution (associated with the maximum
value of the expected net benefit) in 0.02 seconds on an
ordinary laptop with 8.00 GBs of RAM and Intel Core i5
6360U CPU @ 2.00 GHz.
The optimal value of the expected net benefit is 117.8
which is achieved by assigning backup operating system 6
on virtual machines 5 and 6 and backup operating system 5
on virtual machine 9 (d5,6 = 1.0, d6,6 = 1.0, d9,5 = 1.0).
These optimal changes to the upper layer of HARM are
represented in Figure 10.
TABLE 7: Parameters computed for the seven Backup OS
variants
No. Cost of security Exploitability factor Asset Value
1 55 0.55 450
2 65 0.53 490
3 80 0.51 550
4 100 0.49 590
5 120 0.47 620
6 150 0.45 680
7 200 0.43 690
6 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In Subsection 4.2, we showed that deploying Diversity tech-
nique can enhance the security of the cloud by increasing
the AC values (i.e,. the attacker must spend more efforts
to penetrate into the cloud and exploit a target). We also
observed that Diversity decreases the RoA values, which
shows that attacker would have less tendency to attack.
Furthermore, we witnessed that increasing the number of
variants of the OS diversification technique leads to higher
AC values and provides lower values for the RoA metrics.
Comparing three strategies for deploying Diversity tech-
nique on multiple VMs, we show that the best OS diversi-
fication strategy is deploying Diversity technique on VMs
grouped by the BVS group. However, Diversity does not
have significant effects on Risk and Reliability values. In
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Figure 10: Optimal OS Diversity assignment satisfying the
coloring requirement on adjacent nodes and maximizing the
expected net benefit (note that the backup denoted by B5
and B6 are CentOS and OpenBSD, respectively.)
Section 4.3, we showed that combining all MTD techniques
(S+D+R) can improve the security in all aspects with respect
to the security metrics used (i.e., the Risk, AC , RoA, and
Reliability values).
We compared D-Only to combining (S+D+R) and ob-
served that the results of deploying S+D+R are better. The
values of RoA metric in S+D+R is less than the same
metric in D-Only. Moreover, combining S+D+R leads to
more promising results on Reliability, see Figure 5. In fact,
combining S+D+R will help the cloud providers to keep
the security level of the cloud at a desirable level. Figure 6
showed the overall results of combining MTD techniques.
It compares all security metrics before and after deploy-
ing MTD techniques and shows the effectiveness of MTD
deployment in one scope. Comparing metrics in Figure 6,
we observe that deploying S+D+R decreases the RoA and
the overall risk of the cloud while the values of AC , and
Reliability increase. However, one can change the used
parameters to obtain the desired results based on the type of
the cloud and the required security levels. For instance, we
experimented with setting the attack rate to 0.2, and setting
OS diversification variants between 1v to 5v.
In addition, we conducted our experiment based on
modeling a PHC cloud example to evaluate the security
and economic metrics for both Shuffle and Diversity MTD
techniques. We leveraged a VM placement strategy for de-
ploying Shuffle. We also utilized two strategies for deploy-
ing Diversity in which a single backup OS can be deployed
either on one selected VM or a multiple set of selected VMs
in the cloud. We observed that deploying Diversity using
the same OS (one OS variants) on multiple VMs can enhance
RoSI value. We found that deploying four OS diversification
among four VMs has the highest Betweenees values which
leads to the highest RoSI values while incurring a reasonable
CS values compared to other Diversity strategies.
Moreover, we solved an optimal diversity assignment
problem to find the most promising results based on the
given network and a set of various backup OS variants using
theoretical and mathematical optimization model in Sec-
tion 5.9. We showcased our proposed Diversity techniques
by a test case of seven OS variants (Backup OS) and a cloud
network with nine VMs based on the parameters shown in
Table 6. We used Gurobi solver to find the optimal assign-
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ment of OS variants on virtual machines through solving a
binary linear programming model (O-DAP). According to
the globally optimal solution for that instance, among over
134 million possibilities, assigning certain backup OS’s on
certain VMs yields the maximum expected net benefits 5.9.
Limitations: In this paper, we did not consider the economic
metrics for combining all three MTD technique. Since each
MTD technique may vary the security and economic metrics
in different ways. A multi-objective optimization is needed
to solve the problem in a way that three MTD techniques
can be combined effectively to satisfy the security and
economic levels required by the cloud provider based on the
constraints such as the given model and allocated budget.
Moreover, we only include OS-level vulnerabilities on
each VM in order to perform the security analysis, while
there are many other vulnerabilities existing on the cloud
and each VMs such as network, application, service vulner-
abilities, and so on. Hence, a more promising model should
be proposed to cover the other vulnerabilities in the security
analysis phase. We also assumed that the attacker is located
outside of the cloud, but it is also important to propose a
formal model to be able to capture internal threats like the
multi-tenancy and co-residency threats. [26].
Lastly, we deployed an optimization model for Diversity
technique, while modeling and formulating optimization
models for other MTD techniques such as Shuffle and
Diversity can be considered. Moreover, multi-objective opti-
mization can be utilized to find an optimal solution based on
several objective functions such as RoSI and RoA. We plan
to address an integrated optimization model in future work.
Moreover, the obtained optimal values were based on a
single operation only, while MTD techniques can be adapted
and deployed on periodic basis. Deploying defensive MTD
technique can be set periodically or erratically based on
various factors such as the annual rates of attack (ARO),
intrusion detection, and so forth which is out of the scope of
this paper and we aim to address them in our future works.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Several techniques have been proposed to enhance the se-
curity of the cloud. Among them, MTD strategies are the
new paradigm having been examined systematically in the
past couple of years aiming to mitigate the possible cyber-
security threats on the cloud. However, the effectiveness of
combining them for enhancing the security of the cloud
has not been studied well. In this study, we reviewed the
current state-of-the-art MTD techniques applicable in the
cloud. Then, we adopted a formal security model to evaluate
the effects of combined MTD techniques. In comprehensive
experimental analyses, we showed the effectiveness of a
combined approach compared to a single MTD technique.
Our proposed approach can be used for evaluating the
effectiveness of individual or combined MTD techniques
based on both security and economic metrics. Moreover, we
evaluated the effectiveness of MTD techniques for a specific
E-health cloud model to analyze the cost of security against
security achievements. We proposed an optimization model
for Diversity allocation which provides the assignment asso-
ciated with the maximum expected net benefit. Our binary
linear programming formulation handles large instances of
cloud models in a fraction of a second on an ordinary
computer.
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8 APPENDIX*
Gurobi model for the instance of the O-DAP problem used
as a test case in Subsection 5.10 is provided below. Properties
of the seven potential backup operating systems were pro-
vided in Table 6. In this instance, Diversity technique was
to be implemented on nine virtual machines in the network
shown in Figure 8.
Maximize
(-269.2
+ 2915.0 d1,1
+ 3051.4 d1,2
+ ...
+ 4250.5 d9,7
+ -3600.0 e1
+ -3000.0 e2
+ ...
+ -4248.0 e9
+ -100000.0 f1,3
+ -100000.0 f1,4
+ ...
+ -100000.0 f7,9)
Subject To
-1.0 d1,1 + -1.0 d3,1 + f1,3 ≥ -1.0
-1.0 d1,1 + -1.0 d4,1 + f1,4 ≥ -1.0
...
-1.0 d7,7 + -1.0 d9,7 + f7,9 ≥ -1.0
d1,1 + d1,2 + d1,3 + d1,4 + d1,5 + d1,6 + d1,7 ≤ e1
d2,1 + d2,2 + d2,3 + d2,4 + d2,5 + d2,6 + d2,7 ≤ e2
...
d9,1 + d9,2 + d9,3 + d9,4 + d9,5 + d9,6 + d9,7 ≤ e9
Binaries
d1,0, d1,1, ... , d9,7, e1, e2, ... , e9, f1,3, f1,4, ... , f7,9
